When we are confronted with a living system, whose design is mysterious and whose optimizations are obscure, it is no easy task--as Professor Stein reminds us--to arrive at an answer to the question he has posed in this paper. Stein's target article is an important contribution for two main reasons. The first, which we shall mention only in passing, is that it is likely to provide much debate on what the controlled variables might be; moreover, it will force those who find this a burning issue to put their cards on the table. The second, and we feel more important reason, is that the paper poses a question--"What muscle variable(s) does the nervous system control. .. ?"--whose very nature raises questions about the strategies neuroscience uses to investigate problems of control and coordination of movement. In our commentary we will focus on some of the (not so) implicit assumptions behind the question posed by Stein; if nothing else we hope to heighten sensi ti vity to some of the issues involved and (perhaps) to force the neuroscientist to consider his/her epistemology.
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There are a couple of questionable assumptions in Stein's approach--at least as reflected in this article. The first is that 'control is the province of the nervous system; the second is that it is muscle variable (s) that are controlled. We shall examine each assumption in turn and their consequent ramifications for elucidating principles of coordination and control.
In addition, \.Je shall point to one notable omission in the author's list of candidates for control, and in our final remarks take up Stein's invitation to advance, albeit briefly, an al ternati ve position to the control theoretic stance that he advocates here.
Although it may, for the author, seem " ... natural to assess performance ... in similar terms to those applied to motors or other devices which produce movement," we assert that there are certain fundamental differences between living systems and machines (apart from structure) that render such a strategy not vnly dubious but highly unnatural. Most so-called "machine theories" regard biological control as a technical or engineering problem in which the many degrees of freedom to be regulated are a "curse" (Bellman, 1961 Kugler, Kelso, and Turvey, 1982 , for contrasts among these theories and their application to control and coordination) stress autonomy, self-organization and evolution of function as system attributes--attributes that already appeal to some neuroscientists (cf. Katchalsky, Rowland, & Blumenthal, 1974; Llinas & Iberall, 1977; Szentagothai, 1978) .
Though we can classify ourselves as, at best, informed amateurs in this area, we believe these system attributes will prove difficult for the student of movement to ignore. A consideration of the assumptions behind the question posed by Stein may allow us to ground this claim more firmly.
Control as the Province of the Nervous System
It was surely one of Bernstein's (1967) most significant contributions (and he made many that have still to be appreciated) that control and coordination are not reducible to the orchestration of neural signals to and from the motor apparatus.
Stein appears to recognize this fact in several places (e.g., in his discussions of stiffness, and his awareness of the possibility that energy fluxes may shape control), but the paper as a whole shows little appreciation of it. In fact, the predominant methodology in the studies cited by the author dictates that the organism and its parts are quiescent until mechanically or electrically stimulated. Obviously, we do not wish to be interpreted as saying that such a methodology has not proved useful in many cases or that the effects observed are not real. But control involves more than reactivity, and its analysis goes far beyond the deterministic input-output approach espoused in Stein's paper. One wonders to what extent the results of the studies cited by Stein, many of which involve single muscles, in non-intact preparations, can be generalized to normal movements in organisms continually interacting with their environments. There are a number of grounds for expressing skepticism on this issue (cf. Bernstein, 1967) . To be blunt, an unequivocal relation between neural impulses to muscles and resul ting movement does not, and cannot exist (see Benati, Gaglio, Morasso, Tagliasco, & Zaccaria, 1980; Boylls, 1975; Saltzman, 1979; Turvey, Shaw, & Mace, 1978 , for anatomical, mechanical, and physiological sources of functional non-univocality or indeterminacy).
Consider, for example, the task of maintaining the elbow at a steady state angle of 180 degrees (i.e., the elbow in full extension).
The orientation of the arm in the gravity field determines not only the relative contributions of muscle and gravity torques at the desired elbow angle, but also the stability properties of this equilibrium configuration. When the arm is in a downward vertical orientation, the elbow angle is stable; if the elbow is perturbed (flexed), it will return to equilibrium due to the stable restoring torque of gravity. No muscle activity is required in this case. If, however, the arm is in an upward vertical orientation, the elbow angle is unstable since gravity plays a destabilizing role in this configuration. If the equilibrium angle is to be restored, muscle activity is required to provide the stabilizing restorative torque. Thus, the relative contributions of gravity and muscle stiffnesses for a stable equilibrium angle vary with the arm's orientation "controls" only to environment. Its injunctive.
in the gravity field.
In short, the nervous system the extent that it complements the force field of the role is better envisaged as exploitative rather than
On the Selection of Analytic Units
In the target article, Stein has attempted to pinpoint the variables used by the nervous system to control muscular activity during the performance of sensorimotor tasks. Such tasks might involve a limb that moved, remained stationary, or exerted forces and torques at the limb-environment interface.
It is important to recognize, however, that such controlled variables are defined only in the context of the organizational structure(s) comprising the system-to-be-controlled. These organizational structures are defined func--tionally at a higher level of description than that of single muscles or joints. Specifically, they are defined at the relatively abstract task level and, as mentioned in the section above, span the dynamic system composed of both organism and environment. In solving the problem posed by a task, the nervous system is the indispensable medium through which the requisite limb organization can emerge. The limbs (or any set of articulators) thus become different types of functionally defined, special purpose devices for different types of tasks.
Although the immediately preceding statements may seem trivial at first glance, they reveal a perspective that has decidedly non-trivial implications for how we approach the problem of controlled variables. More specifically, this perspective leads us to place significant constraints on our selection of analytic units of behavior. Professor Stein, for example, limits his analysis to " ... simple physical variables appropriate to single muscles or groups of muscles acting normally around a joint." Few scientists would disagree that some decomposition of the system is necessary for analytic purposes. However, the unit of analysis should not be casually or arbitrarily chosen, at least if the ultimate goal is to understand control in animals (not simply in a single joint). Our point can be made through an example from physics (cf. Rosen, 1973) , It is well known that the three-body problem defies an analytic solution in closed form: Whether the earth-sun-moon system is truly stable is an open question. Although it is possible to decompose the system into one-body and two-body subsystems that are completely tractable analytically, such a strategy does not facilitate obtaining a solution to the three-body problem. The reason is that the physical decomposition itself destroys the original dynamics. In order to solve the three-body problem, a new set of analytic units must be discovered that are defined by new observables, such that the parti tioning of the system does not annihilate the original dynamics.
As Rosen (1978) remarks, this partitioning will seem strange to us because we are used to selecting so-called "simple" units that correspond to some physical fractionation of the system. The point is that when we reduce or decompose the system, the greatest care must be taken in selecting the proper unit of analysis. It is most likely that "simplicity" (a term with an exceedingly slippery definition) will be neither the only, nor the chief criterion involved.
Returning to the domain of movement, the identification of appropriate uni ts of analysis has long been a thorny issue, going back at least to Sherrington's reference to the reflex as " ... a simple, if not a probable fiction" (Sherrington, 1906) . More recently, Greene (1971) in echoing Nicolai Bernstein has remarked that much of our confusion in studying problems of coordination has arisen "from our limited ability to recognize the significant informational units of movement." However, there are signs (although only considered in passing in the target article) that some consensus may be drawing near. There has been a growing appreciation that individual muscles (or muscle variables) are not the proper units of analysis for discussing coordinated movements; rather:-such movements are partitioned more naturally into collective functional units defined over groups of muscles and joints, within which component elements vary relatedly and autonomously (e.g., Boylls, 1975; Fowler, 1977; Kelso, Southard, & Goodman, 1979; Lestienne, 1979; Nashner, 197'7; Saltzman, 1979; Szentagothai & Arbib, 1974; Talbott, 1979; Turvey, 1977) , The Soviet school (e. g., Bernstein, 1967; Shik & Orlovskii, 1976) refers to such muscle-joint groupings as linkages or synergies. These terms reflect an appreciation of the fundamental problem of control and coordination, namely that of constraining a complex system with many degrees of freedom to behave in a regular and orderly manner.
Synergies (or coordinative structures, cf. Easton, 1972; Kelso et a1., 1979; Turvey et a1., 1978) by definition are functionally specific units defined over groups of muscles and joints, which constrain the component elements to act together in a manner appropriate to the task at hand. Such muscle collectives are thought to share a common efferent and afferent organization and are deployable as relatively autonomous units in sensorimotor tasks (e.g., Boylls, 1975; Gelfand, Gurfinkel, Tsetlin, & Shik, 1971) . Coordinative structures as functional units of control are currently undergoing rigorous analysis in a number of laboratories; they have been identified in various tasks and at different levels of analysis (cf. Kelso, 1981; Kelso, Tuller, & Harris, in press; , for recent examples). Their chief feature rests in a mutable partitioning of component variables into those that preserve the structural ("topological") organization of movement (e.g., the relative timing and relative force properties of muscular events) and those that are capable of effecting scalar transformations on these qualitative structures. A theoretical rationale for coordinative structures has been offered (cf. Kelso, 1981; Kugler et al., 1980 Kugler et al., , 1982 , focusing on those properties that distinguish movement patterns that exhibit structural stability from those that do not.
There are indications in the target article that Professor Stein prefers to sidestep the issue of functionally specific units of movement as not germane to his interests, and as one that pertains only to "multijoint movements" or the "large behavioral literature on complex patterned movement." However, he does not hesitate to negate arguments for length and stiffness control on the basis of "complex patterned movements" like speech or piano playing in the case of length, and walking in the case of stiffness. We welcome the functional argument in each case, although we note that for Stein it involves jumping rather precariously between muscle-joint levels (e.g., stiffness and length) and task levels of analysis (such as skiing and needlethreading).
Though aware of the problem, Stein seems to apply a single muscle-joint unit of analysis generally to all types of complex multijoint tasks. Such an approach is at the same time too powerful and too arbitrary. It is too powerful because it allows descriptions of movement control that fail to distinguish between those acts that do occur and those acts that are physically possible but never occur. It is too arbitrary because single joint actions will rarely relate unequivocally to particular task functions.
In short, when we deal with coordinated activity, we are dealing with task specific functional units whose degrees of freedom are constrained according to task demands, or more generally, to the mutual relationship between organism and environment.
Contrasting Views on the Origins of Order
Whenever we observe a regular and orderly phenomenon, it is always a temptation to assign responsibility to some device that is antecedent to, and causally responsible for, the said phenomenon. The device has available to it "representations" that have characteristics very much like the phenomenon we are trying to understand. As philosophers have often told us, "representations" require users with goals and interests (much like the animal itself) and so, when we assume their presence, we take out a loan on intelligence that must ultimately be paid back (cf. Dennett, 1978; Searle, 1980) . We can bury our heads in the sand on this issue or we can approach the problem in a different way: one that asks not how control can be explained according to some~priori prescription for the system (such as the central representations and the cybernetic, negative feedback paradigms favored by Stein), but rather how control arises as an~posteriori consequence of the system's dynamical organization.
For example, imagine adopting the former, prescriptive strategy to a coherent biological phenomenon such as the schooling of fish. What we observe are individual fish behaving collectively in a highly coordinated manner. The "system" in this case has many degrees of freedom and exhibits an organized, seemingly wholistic structure. Adopting a prescriptive strategy, we might search the system for a "reference value" or a "central representation" that regulates the individual fish or the collective of fish, but it would make little sense to do so. These would be special mechanisms introduced by the unknowing observer to account for a poorly understood phenomenon.
In fact, the highly coherent behavior of fish schooling can be accounted for with a fairly small set of key variables, such as "density" defined through the metric of fish length. When the average distance between nearest neighbors is less than one fish length (note that the metric is "intrinsic" and systemscaled; cf. Warren & Shaw, 1981) , spacing between fish is schooled not random (cf. Okubo, 1980, for an in-depth analysis).
Al though the details of collective fish behavior may seem far removed from the issues raised by Stein, there is, we think, an important message for the neuroscientist or psychologist. It is that an understanding of a complex, organizational phenomenon such as fish schooling rests with articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions for that organization to occur. More generally this approach entails a strategy that rejects the introduction of special mechanisms--as sources of explanation--before dynamics has been fully explored. Put another way, what can we, as students of movement, explain "for free" before we burden the nervous system with the onus of control?
In this regard, it is puzzling to us that Stein chooses to ignore a model whose dynamics obviate (or at least significantly reduce) the requirement for ongoing, computational control. If recent work is a guide, much may be gained through the identification of functional units of movement with nonlinear mass-spring systems. Although the model has received an uneven interpretation, its import for us is that it allows one to see the qualitative similarities between certain aspects of movement control (such as the ability to reach the same desired spatial location, with different trajectories and from variable initial conditions) and the behavior of a mass-spring system. Following our arguments expressed above, the beauty of the mass-spring model lies not in the literal parallel between a single muscle and a spring, but in the recognition that particular behaviors share--to a first approximation--the same abstract functional organization as a mass-spring system.
The intuition that a muscle~joint system is dynamically similar to a mass-spring system with controllable equilibrium length is due to Fel'dman (cf. Fel'dman, 1966, p. 771) , and has undergone appropriate extension by a number of authors (e.g., Bizzi, Polit, & Morasso, 1976; Kelso, 1977; Polit & Bizzi, 1978; Schmidt & McGown, 1980) . The basic idea is that a given joint angle may be specified according to a set of muscle equilibrium lengths. Once these are specified, the joint will achieve and maintain a desired final angle at which the torques generated by the muscles sum to zero.
Such a system exhibits the property of equifinality in that desired positions may be reached from various initial angles, and in spite of unforeseen perturbations encountered during the motion trajectory (see Kelso, Holt, Kugler, & Turvey, 1980 for review; but also Saltzman, 1979 , for some cautionary notes). Fel'dman (1966 Fel'dman ( , 1980 has further noted that stiffness at a joint may be specified in terms of agonist and antagonist equilibrium lengths even if the stiffness of these muscles is not itself controllable. In the Fel'dman model, joint stiffness covaries with the degree of agonistantagonist co-contraction.
Two points for Stein emerge from this discussion. One concerns a sin of omission in that he includes the spring property of stiffness as a possible control variable, but neglects the related variable of equilibrium length. The other, perhaps more important issue warrants a little further development, because of its theoretical consequences. It is that in likening (to a first apprOXimation) a constrained collective of muscles to a mass-spring system, the need to introduce externally imposed measurement, comparison, and control operations is reduced.
Though we could describe a dynamical system like a mass-spring in terms of externally imposed reference levels and though we could mathematize it into canonical feedback form, little would be gained by doing so (cf. Yates, in press).
A muscle collecti ve~spring system is intrinsically self-equilibrating:
conserved values such as the equilibrium point emerge from the system's parameterization. More emphatically, in massspring systems (like schools of fish and functional groupings of muscles?) there is no need to introduce a "representation" anywhere.
Toward an Alternative Control Scheme
In our final comments we take up--in rather condensed fashion because of space limitations--Professor Stein's invitation to his critics to offer an alternative scheme to the one that he has put forward so authoritatively. We refer to an emerging theoretical view of movement control and coordination that has been expressed in two recent papers (Kugler et a1., 1980 (Kugler et a1., , 1982 and that has also undergone some, as yet limited, empirical scrutiny (Kelso, Holt, Kugler, & Turvey, 1980; Kelso, Holt, Rubin, & Kugler, in press ). Its origins (and to a large extent its appeal) lie in a unified treatment of cooperative phenomena at all scales of magnitude (cf. Haken, 1977) . Hence it speaks to the important issue raised by Stein at the beginning of his article, namely that of relating levels of analysis. Moreover, the perspective is consonant with some of the themes introduced above and also may interface with evolving oscillator theoretic views of neural control not considered by Stein in the target article (e.g., Delcomyn, 1980) .
A chief distinguishing feature of the view expressed here lies in the recogni tion that first and foremost, living systems belong to a class of physical systems that are open to fluxes of energy and matter (in contrast, cybernetic systems are closed to energy and matter exchange with their surrounds).
The principal theories addressing such systems are Iberall's Homeokinetic Theory (e.g., Iberall, 1977 Iberall, , 1978 Soodak & Iberall, 1978; Yates & Iberall, 1973 ) and Prigogine's Dissipative structure Theory (e.g., Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; Prigogine, 1980) . The former, in particular, addresses systemic phenomena in biology and elaborates, among other things, the conditions for persistence of function, autonomy, and self-organization. It represents a concerted effort to apply irreversible thermodynamics to living systems.
A fundamental tenet is that in steady-state systems the flow of energy through the system plays an organizing role and that, following Morowitz's theorem, energy flow from a potential source to a lower order sink will lead to at least one cycle in the system (cf. Morowitz, 1968) . Homeokinetic theory builds on the Barnard-Cannon principle of homeostasis (which contained no mechanism for preservation of conserved states); in the homeokinetic view, control is dynamically effected by means of coupled ensembles of limit cycle oscillatory processes. Limit cycles represent the only temporal stability for non-conservative, nonlinear systems; they resemble "squirt" systems that, by virtue of their design, are capable of making up for dissipative losses that occur in the drift toward equilibrium (see Yates & Iberall, 1973) , The system's conserved values or equilibrium operating points are thought to be specified in the loose coupling of limit cycle processes. Limit cycles are manifestations of thermodynamic engines and quantize action (formally, the product of energy and time; cf. Iberall, 1978) at every level in the system.
As functional units of movement, ensembles of nonlinear limit cycle oscillators offer a number of attractive features for a principled account of coordination and control. Among these are their self-sustaining properties, their ability to operate independently of initial conditions, their stability in the face of moderate perturbations, and, perhaps most important for the theorist of movement, the properties of mutual entrainment and synchronization (cf. Minorsky, 1962; Winfree, 1980) . With respect to the issues raised by Stein, it is worth emphasizing that limit cycles are not special mechanisms~se.
To observe spectrally distributed limit cycle regimes and for new spatiotemporal organizations to emerge, certain necessary conditions must exist. Among these are the presence of many interacting degrees of freedom, nonlinearities, a relatively constant source of potential enel'gy and the requirement that energy be dissipated. Given such conditions and subject to critical scaling influences, constraints emerge that are capable of marshalling the free variables into coherent functions.
Quadruped gait may be an example: When one stable movement pattern is driven beyond a critical value on a system-sensitive parameter, a bifurcation occurs and a new spatiotemporal pattern--a new stability-~arises. In such a view, no explicit "gait selection" process is required (e.g., Gallistel, 1980) . To reiterate our main point, however, in the perspective offered here, order (control and coordination) is functionally specified in the system's dynamics. The radical claim, as Gibson (1979) once remarked, is that behavior is regular but there are no regulators. A less radical statement would be an affirmative answer to Yates' (1980) question to the readers of the American Journal of Physiology: Do [you] know of a serious effort to discharge the homunculus?
The spirit of the foregoing discussion leads us to raise one final issue. It is the growing intuition--stemming from theoretical considerations raised here and elsewhere (cf. Anderson, 1972) --that the problem of order in natural systems might be attacked more effectively by seeking out a single set of physical principles that can apply at all levels, rather than by positing different units of analysis at each level. One assumes nature operates with ancient themes. In this commentary we have tried to provide a flavor for the ones that neuroscience in general, and the field of motor control in particular, might consider worth orchestrating.
